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For traveling up to the highlands of Tibet today, 
there is no better resource available than Victor Chan's 
Tibet Handbook: A Pilgrimage Guide. One 
doesn't read guidebooks for their historical chapters or 
the language lessons, of course, and though Chan's 
efforts here are slightly uneven, they do provide 
generally reliable overviews that show awareness of 
fairly recent historical scholarship. This guidebook 
defines its main task as providing a sourcebook for 
western pilgrims and trekkers. As such, it is a treasure 
in a class of its own for its mind-boggling assembly 
of regional facts, maps, architectural drawings, site 
research, and travel suggestions on every region of the 
Tibet Autonomous Region. The information provided 
on the extant monuments and settlements has involved 
a vast amount of on-site observation and research and 
such a synthesis exists nowhere else in European 
languages. Who can vouch for its wide-ranging accuracy 
overall ? On the book jacket, the peerless peripatetic 
fieldworker Melvyn Goldstein calls the book 
"wonderful" and "invaluable," while Michael Aris lauds 
Chan as "a worthy successor of the great explorers of 
the nineteenth century." If so, its hard to fault the cost 
or bulk (2" wide) for home reference or as travel 
companion. 
Like all of these other works, Tibet Handbook 
provides a very useful synthesis and many new starting 
points from which to venture further into one's 
understanding of Tibet and its civilization. 
Todd T. Lewis 
College of the Holy Cross 
The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet. Rebecca Redwood French. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. xviii + 404, 64 Plates, 17 Figures. 
The Golden Yoke is the long-awaited result of 
Rebecca French's four years of field research among 
Tibetans in Tibet, Nepal, India, England, and the United 
States on the subject of Tibetan law. Based on over 
two hundred interviews with former government 
officials, lamas, chieftains, judges, mediators, prisoners, 
and other Tibetans knowledgeable about law, as well as 
on legal texts brought out of Tibet and stored in the 
Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, 
India, French's work is the most intensive treatment of 
the topic of Tibetan law to date. French's research is 
thus valuable to anyone studying legal thought and 
process not only in Tibet but also in the ethnically-
Tibetan regions of Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan, and 
northern Nepal. 
French's main argument is that Tibetan law is best 
understood in terms of Tibetans' own legal cosmology, 
a system of thought about law, causation, intention, 
and morality, which is ultimately derived from Tibetan 
Buddhism. Tibet's legal cosmology is "so thoroughly 
Buddhist," she argues, that "none of the typical maxims 
[that] would apply to a bureaucratic legal system apply 
to Tibet" (1995: 343). Tibet's legal system is "unique" 
and is "incomprehensible" in terms of any context other 
than the Buddhist religion from which it derives (1995: 
345). 
Within the context of Tibetan Buddhism, then, 
French identifies "twelve major elements of the Tibetan 
cosmology of law" (1995: 17) which she presents 
throughout Part Two of her book. Central to the 
Tibetan cosmology of law is the concept of sems, or 
mind, the perfection of which, French argues, is the 
goal of the Tibetan legal system (1995: 76). The life of 
the Buddha serves as the model for the perfection of 
mind, a model which is contrasted with the "bargaining 
model" of Islamic law and the "reasonable man" model 
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of Anglo-American law (1995: 59, 77, 343). Other 
concepts which French examines include the "ten non-
virtuous acts" (mi-dge-wa bchu), the law of karma 
(chhos), inner morality (rang-khrims), authority (mnga'-
'og), and appropriateness ('os-pa). Nine jurisdictions 
(1995: 115) and four legal rituals (1995: 121-7) are also 
identified and examined. 
Four arguments emerge from the analysis: The 
Tibetan legal system was highly particularistic and case-
specific; precedent did not play a role in the decision-
making process (1995: 143). Tibetan legal cases were 
never considered "closed"; "even after a signed document 
had been issued by a conciliator or court, the case could 
be reconsidered by the parties at any later date" ( 1995: 
139). "Truth" in the Tibetan legal system was based on 
"factual consonance" rather than "objective 
determination" (1995: 137-8). And the Tibetan legal 
system was characterized by "great flexibility in choice 
and level of forum" as well as "type of legal procedure"; 
"Tibetans could start a case at any of a wide variety of 
levels [using] any of the four different types of 
procedure... and then move back and forth between 
levels, forums, and procedures" (1995: 139). "The 
amount of leeway and play in the system," she writes, 
"was one of the key reasons that Asian scholars 
presumed for many years that no Tibetan legal system 
existed" (1995: 139). 
Throughout the remainder of the book, French 
presents personal narratives that describe legal 
procedures and legal cases, as they were remembered by 
her informants, as a means through which to 
demonstrate how the Tibetan legal system operated in 
Tibet from 1940-1959. Part One of the book is a 
general introduction to Tibetan history, as told by 
Tibetan exile government officials. Part Three presents 
narratives about law "from the countryside." Part Four 
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examines the Tibetan central government bureaucracy at 
Lhasa. Part Five analyzes Tibetan beliefs about crime 
and punishment. The conclusion presents a number of 
unanswered questions, most of which relate to issues of 
comparability. 
Comparability is the main problem with French's 
book. Throughout the book, French compares the 
Tibetan legal system with the U.S. legal system, a 
comparison which serves only to highlight the 
"uniqueness" of Tibetan legal practices. Many of the 
characteristics which French identifies as "unique" to the 
Tibetan legal system are, in actuality, not so unique, 
however. Lack of the use of precedent is characteristic 
of Islamic legal systems as well as many African legal 
systems (Rosen 1984, 1989; Fallers 1969). Lack of 
closure is characteristic of the legal systems of village 
Turkey (Starr 1978) and other communities characterized 
by "feud-like violence" (Leach 1964; Bourdieu 1966; 
Gluckman 1965; Ruffini 1978). A consensual 
definition of truth is an essential part of many legal 
systems and, as some analyses demonstrate, is not 
always as "consensual" as it is made to seem (Kuper 
1970; El-Hakim 1978; Woodburn 1979; Nader 1990). 
Choice of forum also is characteristic of the legal 
system of India (Galanter 1981; Meschievitz and 
Galanter 1982) and even the U.S. legal system 
(Greenhouse 1982) among others. The structure of the 
Tibetan legal system, as French herself notes, is similar 
to that of other bureaucratic systems in Asia (1995: 15). 
Even the cosmology through which the Tibetan legal 
system is understood may have some similarities with 
other Buddhist legal systems, such as Thailand's or Sri 
Lanka's, yet French makes no effort to compare them. 
The second problem with her book is its lack of 
social and political context. French's very sparse use of 
Goldstein (1992, 1989a, 1989b, 1988, 1986, 1973, 
1971a, 1971b, 1968), confined to a single paragraph 
about his "view of law" (1995: 14-15), is part of the 
reason for the problem. The separation of crucial 
issues, such as land incorporation (1995: 53), 
inheritance (1995: 172-4), and taxation (1995: 215), 
from the analysis of the "cases" is another reason for the 
problem. The lack of attention to nomad-farmer trade 
relations; patron-client relations (patron/priest, 
landholder/tenant; chieftain/commoner); and village 
leadership-central government relations, all crucial to 
the politics of Tibet, also contributes to the problem. 
"Who has power and how is it used?" is central to the 
study of law (Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Benda-
Beckmann and Taale 1992) yet is a question which 
French largely ignores. 
French's conflation of legal ideology with legal 
process and legal structure is another reason for the 
problem. Analyses of process require different forms of 
evidence than analyses of ideology (Moore 1978), yet 
French presents statements about legal ideology as if 
they also demonstrate legal process, such as with her 
analysis of "nomadic legal processes" ( 1995: 204). 
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French seems to recognize the difference between 
idedlogy and process when she writes: "All Tibetans 
agreed that the Ten Nonvirtuous Acts had negative 
karmic consequences," yet "When asked if the same ten 
acts could be penalized in a legal forum... most 
responded that only [some] could be punished by the 
secular courts" (1995: 80); and "Tibetan officials also 
carved a clean line between religious views and secular 
legal views with respect to the practical outcome of a 
case. Disputes and crimes had to be handled and 
sanctioned in this world, without reliance on or 
presumption of karmic causes or effects in other worlds, 
which were unknowable" (1995: 81). Her recognition 
of the difference does not influence her analysis which 
mistakes ideology for process throughout the book. 
French also conflates legal ideology with legal 
structure, particularly when she combines central 
government law (the formal legal system) with 
customary legal practices (the many informal legal 
systems) as if they were part of the same system (1995: 
121-158). Even if they were derived from the same 
legal ideology, an argument which French makes but 
does not substantiate, from the point of view of social 
and political organization, they were not the same 
system (1995: 164-171). Whether analyzed as different 
"legal levels" of the same system, or as different 
systems altogether, differences in legal content, legal 
process, access to the system, and relative evaluation of 
the system need to be considered (Pospisil 1974: 107) 
and need to be accounted for in the "cases" presented as 
evidence to support the book's arguments. 
Choice of "legal level," in particular, needs to be 
considered: When did people used the formal legal 
system and when did they not? French presents the 
issue as if it were an issue of unbounded choice. In the 
story about the wandering monk thief, for example, 
monks from a monastery in Sakya complained that 
another monk was stealing their food at night and so 
they asked the headman of the village to intervene. The 
headman took the man into his own household and gave 
him the responsibility of caring for the animals; in the 
end he turned into a virtuous man again. Why did the 
headman handle the case and not the monastic officials? 
Most monasteries in Tibet had their own rules about 
discipline and assigned their own officials to handle 
disciplinary cases. Why did the monks in this particular 
case approach the headman for help instead? Was the 
headman related to the wandering monk? The answer 
may have provided French with some of the social and 
political context which her analysis lacks. 
Lack of comparison and lack of social and political 
context contribute to two other tendencies in her book. 
The first is a tendency toward an "orientalist" view of 
the Tibetans. French herself cites Lopez's (1994) article 
on "orientalist" approaches to Tibetans, and French 
seems to concur with what he says, yet her own writing 
makes the Tibetans seem entirely incomprehensible. 
French writes: "Our discussion traveled in and out of 
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various worlds ... and I thought again, 'Cosmic events 
are creating dissension, and yet, at the same time, 
dissension can create cosmic anger?' I had a feeling at 
once of surreal reality, of the sensical incomprehensible, 
of the mundane and fantastic coexisting in the everyday. 
His was a blended world of thought with 
interpenetrating cosmic realms existing and interacting, 
all in the present" (1995: 8). 
The second is a tendency to present narrative as 
reality. What French presents as evidence for her 
arguments are stories told by legal practitioners many 
years after the events occurred. French does not present 
the stories as stories, however; she presents them as 
"detailed pictures of the actual practice of law by 
particular individuals" (1995: 195). Whenever anyone 
tells a story, various layers of self-presentation and re-
interpretation in the present context shape the story-
telling process (Reissman 1993), yet French does not 
acknowledge that process. Tibetans are wonderful story 
tellers, as anyone who works with Tibetans knows, yet 
their stories do not always represent what actually 
happened. Stories are sometimes told in jest. Other 
people's stories are sometimes told as one's own. 
Stories are sometimes told for the purpose of making a 
point; the events depicted may not even have occurred at 
all. What, in a story, is reliable information and what 
is not, is useful to know and is essential when used as 
evidence in an argument. Yet French gives the reader 
no means through which to evaluate the stories she 
presents: What in the story is accurate, or at least 
plausible? And what is clearly narrative elaboration? 
In the land dispute story that opens the book, for 
example, French describes how the monk administrator, 
Sonam, proceeded in his investigation of a case. 
Sonam is shown examining plot boundaries as they 
were marked on Tibetan monastic estates: White stones 
were placed in the earth one foot beneath the above-
ground boundary markers in case the above-ground 
markers were moved during a dispute (1995: 2). Sonam 
is also shown reading through a fine (babs) clause 
included in the decision of a previous case involving a 
land dispute (1995: 7). Whether or not these details are 
accurate would be important for other people studying 
in ethnic Tibetan communities to know, yet French 
makes no attempt to evaluate their veracity. When they 
are placed in the same story next to details which are 
very likely narrative elaboration, such as Sonam's 
efforts to teach his students about land law (1995: 5), 
the reader is left wondering how much weight to give 
not only the story as a whole, but also to all of the 
other parts of it. 
Nevertheless, The Golden Yoke does tell a good 
story. French's descriptions are vivid and lively; the 
photographs she includes give the reader a sense of 
"being there." The book is interesting to read and, with 
the qualifications presented above, is recommended for 
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Contested Hierarchies: a Collaborative Ethnography of Caste in the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. 
Edited by David Gellner and Declan Quigley. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. xiii+324, appendix, notes, 
bibliography, and index. 
Even though many contemporary scholars attempt 
to downplay its importance, South Asian Anthropology 
still lingers under the shadow of caste. Edited by David 
Gellner and Declan Quigley, Contested Hierarchies 
:a Collaborative Ethnography of Caste in the 
Kathmandu Valley, Nepal, not only provides an 
innovative study into the role caste plays in the 
Kathmandu Valley, but also develops a systematic 
approach for the study of caste in general. The book is 
a well-rounded and balanced work which neither follows 
Louis Dumont's understanding of caste as the essence of 
South Asia (University of Chicago Press: 1980), nor 
that of Ron In den who dismisses caste as the creation of 
Western cultural hegemony (Blackwell: 1990). Instead, 
David Gellner, Hiroshi Ishii, Todd Lewis, Rajendra 
Pradhan, Gerard Toffin and Declan Quigley-the six 
authors of this collection of essays--combine their vast 
ethnographic knowledge of the Kathmandu Valley to 
analysize how specific Newar caste ( Jat ) structures 
operate. 
Besides mediating the caste debate, Contested 
Hierarchies also treads a middle path between the two 
extremes of Nepalese studies and the available academic 
methods. On one side is the static structural model, as 
preeminently represented in Nepalese studies by Robert 
Levy's Mesocosm, which describes the Newar city of 
Bhaktapur as a clockwork mechanism (University of 
California Press, 1990). And on the other side, are the 
post-modern transnational cultural flows exemplified by 
John Gray in his essay "Driving in a Soft City: 
Trafficking in Images of Identity and Power on the 
Roads of Kathmandu" (in Anthropology of Nepal, 
Mandala Book Point, 1994). Unlike the contextualized 
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studies in Contested Hierarchies, both Levy and 
Gray misconstrue the actual ethnographic evidence: 
Levy because he places agency in a timeless South 
Asian ballet, and thereby ignores the people who 
actually live in Bhaktapur; and Gray because he 
concentrates on what is 'modern' in Kathmandu, and 
thereby ignores how indigenous social structures have 
been used to negotiate the far-reaching social changes 
which have occurred in recent decades. 
Between these two extremes, Contested 
Hierarchies takes a middle path which does not break 
with previous Western or South Asian scholarship on 
caste, but builds upon it by concentrating on specific 
ethnographic accounts. The essays in the book analyze 
such topics as the coexistence of competing caste 
hierarchies; the complexity of actual caste and 'sub-
caste' organizations; the importance of kingship and 
symbols of the center; the influence of territorial 
location on caste; and the use of ritual specialists as 
markers of status and as makers of identity. The 
collection also demonstrates that grounding a debate on 
caste in Nepal is not arbitrary, but necessary. In the 
introduction Gellner argues that there are three main 
reasons for the necessity of studying caste in the 
Kathmandu Valley. First, Nepal is the last Hindu 
Kingdom and thereby preserves pre-British and pre-
Muslim social patterns. Second, the Kathmandu 
valley's small size, makes possible a comprehensive 
study of all the caste groups within it. And third, 
because the Valley contains both cities and villages it is 
possible to conduct a study which avoids the rural 
emphasis which has biased most anthropological work 
on caste. 
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